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Using data compiled from concentrated residential urban revitalization programs implemented in Richmond,
VA, between 1999 and 2004, we study residential externalities. Specifically, we provide evidence
that in neighborhoods targeted by the programs, sites that did not directly benefit from capital improvements
nevertheless experienced considerable increases in land value relative to similar sites in a control neighborhood.
Within the targeted neighborhoods, increases in land value are consistent with externalities that fall
exponentially with distance. In particular, we estimate that housing externalities decrease by half approximately
every 990 feet. On average, land prices in neighborhoods targeted for revitalization rose by 2 to 5 percent
at an annual rate above those in the control neighborhood. These increases translate into land value
gains of between $2 and $6 per dollar invested in the program over a six-year period. We provide a
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The existence of cities is a manifestation of the presence of agglomeration forces between
economic agents. While much has been written about the nature and characteristics of
these forces, most studies have focused on agglomeration forces between producers. As
a result, virtually all urban theories have these producer-based agglomeration economies at
their core.1 In fact, agglomeration e⁄ects can also result from interactions between residents.
Speci￿cally, they can take the form of housing externalities whereby improvements made to
a particular house can have an e⁄ect on the value of nearby houses. To the extent that
these e⁄ects decline with distance, this form of externalities can lead to the agglomeration of
residents and, potentially, the formation of cities. Moreover, because the presence of housing
externalities may justify government intervention, in that equilibrium allocations will di⁄er
from e¢ cient outcomes, assessing the importance of these externalities in practice is central to
urban policy. In this paper, therefore, we study the magnitude and characteristics of housing
externalities. We are interested in the e⁄ects of housing externalities on average land prices
and in how fast these e⁄ects decline with distance. These are the key characteristics that
lead to agglomeration.
The standard problem in measuring agglomeration e⁄ects lies in the circular causation
present in all spatial concentrations of economic activity. People and ￿rms locate in a spe-
ci￿c area because that area is particularly productive or pleasant to live in, but the area
is particularly productive or pleasant to live in because others chose to reside or work at
that location. This implies that identifying agglomeration e⁄ects in the data requires an
exogenous source of variation in the ￿attractiveness￿of a given location. In this paper, we
exploit such a source of variation by taking advantage of an urban revitalization program
implemented in Richmond, Virginia, between 1999 and 2004: the Neighborhoods-in-Bloom
(NiB) program. We describe the program and its associated policies in detail in Section
2. For now, we note that this program represented federally funded housing investments
concentrated in a few disadvantaged neighborhoods. We know the location of homes that
obtained direct funding, and the amount that was received. We also have information on
housing prices and a comprehensive list of housing characteristics before and after the pro-
gram was implemented. This information allows us, using a hedonic regression, to estimate
land prices before and after the policy was implemented. Taking into account city-wide time
e⁄ects, we can calculate the e⁄ects of the program in the various treated neighborhoods. Put
another way, we estimate the e⁄ects of the policy on land values controlling for investments
1See the theoretical survey in Duranton and Puga (2004) and the empirical survey in Rosenthal and
Strange (2004).
2in observable housing characteristics. By carrying out this exercise only for houses that were
not directly targeted by the Neighborhoods-in-Bloom program, we ensure that the e⁄ects
we measure are not the valuation of unobservable investments directly associated with its
policies.
We estimate changes in land prices, following the Neighborhoods-in-Bloom program, that
are consistent with the predictions of a simple theory of housing externalities. We present
this theory in Section 3. In particular, increases in the returns to land decline with distance
from the impact area. This e⁄ect, which we measure nonparametrically in the data, emerges
clearly and corresponds to housing externalities that decline by half approximately every
990 feet. The theory also has predictions for the magnitude of the e⁄ects induced by the
Neighborhoods-in-Bloom policies that are consistent with our measurements. Finally, we
use the ￿ndings from our estimation exercise to obtain parameter values for our model. This
step potentially allows the model to guide the design of urban policies, although we leave
this task to future research.
The exercise we have just described does not directly allow us to make statements re-
garding the total return to land associated with the Neighborhood-in-Bloom program. We
are able to assess whether changes in land prices are consistent with housing externalities
that decline with distance, and how fast they decline, but additional information is needed to
draw conclusions regarding the average increase in land values associated with these external
e⁄ects. We use time e⁄ects at the city level to control for any city-wide changes and, po-
tentially, general equilibrium e⁄ects induced by the Neighborhood-in-Bloom policies. That
said, as indicated in Section 2, the magnitudes of these policies are generally small enough
that they are unlikely to a⁄ect land rents in the city as a whole. In order to identify the
e⁄ects of the revitalization policies that arise by way of housing externalities, one needs to
take a stand on the scope of these externalities, and measure increases in land values over
and above those at the boundary of a selected neighborhood. This is, in principle, problem-
atic since we have little information regarding the scope of housing externalities, nor do we
know whether other non-observables might have a⁄ected land values at the boundaries of the
neighborhoods under consideration. Fortunately, a key feature of Neighborhoods-in-Bloom
o⁄ers us an alternative approach.
One of the unique aspects of the study we carry out in this paper relates to the presence
of a neighborhood that shares almost identical physical and demographic characteristics as
those selected for urban revitalization. Although initially considered by the Neighborhoods-
in-Bloom task force, this neighborhood did not ultimately receive funding for reasons that
were secondary and non-economic in nature. Hence, we use it as a control with which to
contrast our ￿ndings for neighborhoods explicitly targeted by the urban renewal program.
3Two key results emerge: i) in contrast to the treated neighborhoods, our estimates of changes
in land rents in the control neighborhood do not fall with distance as we move away from
its centroid. This result is consistent with the idea that one cannot measure changes in land
valuations resulting from housing externalities in the absence of an exogenous source of vari-
ation in land prices, ii) we compute average land price increases in the control neighborhood
and show that they fall signi￿cantly short of those measured in the targeted neighborhoods.
We then use the ￿ndings associated with the control neighborhood to infer increases in land
values arising from externalities induced by the revitalization policies. We ￿nd land value
gains in the targeted neighborhoods that range between $2 and $6 per dollar invested in the
program over a six-year period.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been only few studies of housing externalities
that rely on a policy experiment with individual housing transaction data, and none where
the experiment was spatially concentrated to the degree of Neighborhoods-in-Bloom. In
Section 5, we compare our ￿ndings with other work that exploit parametric approaches to
measure the decline in externalities across space. In general, we ￿nd housing externalities
that decrease somewhat slower with distance. Ioannides (2002) ￿nds important residential
neighborhood e⁄ects using neighborhood clusters in U.S. cities. These neighborhood e⁄ects,
which have received some theoretical and empirical attention in the literature, are broader
than the housing externalities considered in this paper as they include other forms of social
interactions. See for example Benabou (1996) for an insightful theoretical model describing
these types of social interactions and their e⁄ects. There are several studies, both theoretical
and empirical, that have analyzed urban renewal projects. Davis and Whinston (1961),
Rothenberg (1967), and Schall (1976) are notable early examples. None, however, include
the type of detailed empirical work we perform in this paper. On a theoretical level, Strange
(1992) provides an informative discussion of policy in the presence of strong interactions
across neighborhoods.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Neighborhoods-
in-Bloom program. Section 3 presents the model and the e⁄ects of housing subsidies on
equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 discusses our empirical methodology and Section 5 presents
our ￿ndings. Section 6 o⁄ers concluding remarks.
2Durlauf (2004) provides a survey of the literature on neighborhood e⁄ects.
42 The Neighborhoods-in-Bloom Urban Revitalization
Program
The Neighborhoods-in-Bloom (NiB) program was an outgrowth of the observation by Rich-
mond city o¢ cials that during the previous 25 years, investment programs undertaken to
revitalize areas within the city had demonstrated only limited success. They noted that
the programs had often improved small areas￿ such as a city block￿but in many instances,
measurable improvement in the surrounding neighborhoods remained elusive.
In evaluating the features of previous programs, o¢ cials noted that investment activity￿
in most cases using federal funding sources￿had often been targeted in a scattered fashion.
This approach had the advantage of reaching a large number of city neighborhoods that
quali￿ed under federal guidelines, but available funding per area was necessarily limited. The
resulting constraints on investment activity led to impacts on home prices in surrounding
areas that were di¢ cult to gauge. Because city o¢ cials￿objective was to visibly raise the
values of surrounding homes, an idea developed that investment concentrated in fewer areas
might yield more measurable e⁄ects. This approach, they reasoned, might lead to a more
noticeable revitalization of the city￿ s housing stock than had the previous, more scattered
approach.
To carry out this experiment, city o¢ cials began to identify potential areas for invest-
ment, determine the number of sites to target and source funding. As had historically been
the case, the City of Richmond had numerous areas that quali￿ed for revitalization funding
through the Department of Housing and Development￿ s (HUD) Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) and Home Investment Partnership (HOME) programs. Additional
funding was made available through other federal monies as well as through the non pro￿t Lo-
cal Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), a community development corporation (CDC).
The CDBG and HOME funding was attractive to the city, in part, because it was outside
money. Simply put, these funds come from the federal government, and the resulting in-
vestments bene￿t the city without reducing local spending on consumption or investment
that would otherwise occur if the funds were raised through local taxes. Interestingly, LISC
funding also has this advantage. Founded by the Ford Foundation, LISC is a national or-
ganization headquartered in New York and is funded by nationwide donations. Because of
this structure, funds that ￿ ow from the organization to Richmond are e⁄ectively exogenous
as well in that they do not necessarily originate from local sources.
The selection process of investment sites was a multiple step process. Past scattered
approaches to investment had been driven in part by political pressures to fund areas within
nearly all city council members￿districts. Aware that a more concentrated approach would
5likely fund fewer sites than the number of districts, broad support of a small number of sites
was a primary objective. To achieve that support, in mid 1998, Richmond administrators es-
tablished an internal planning task force composed of the acting city manager, the assistant
city manager, and representatives from a variety of city departments associated with hous-
ing and economic development. Several members within the group developed indicators of
neighborhood conditions and data that served as comparative portraits of the neighborhoods
that quali￿ed to receive CDBG or HOME funds. Throughout 1998 and into early 1999, sta⁄
from the city￿ s Community Development Department met with community groups to explain
and gather feedback on the approach. In particular, city sta⁄ and members of the groups
also toured the potential sites, and support for both the concept and for a small group of
neighborhoods had come together by February 1999. Later that year, the city community
development department recommended four broad neighborhoods. These were Church Hill
Central, Southern Barton Heights-Highland Park-Southern Tip, Jackson Ward-Carver, and
Blackwell. The locations and size of these neighborhoods relative to the city of Richmond
are shown in Figure 1.
Table 1A. Demographics of selected neighborhoods
Total Housing Percent Percent
Neighborhood Persons Units Non-White Below Poverty
Church Hill 1505 822 94.8 27.2
Blackwell 1376 651 97.0 35.8
Highland Park-Barton 2763 1227 97.2 26.3
Jackson Ward-Carver 1975 1332 81.7 29.5
Bellemeade 2742 947 90.2 31.6
City of Richmond 197790 92282 61.5 20.3
These four neighborhoods share many common characteristics. All had been selected
according to criteria developed by the city￿ s community development sta⁄ and had con-
centrations of vacant structures, substantial poverty, and low home ownership rates. In
addition, the capacity of the areas to revitalize absent NiB investment was viewed as low.
The neighborhoods also had active nonpro￿t Community Development Corporations (CDCs)
in place. This was an important feature in that funds from the HUD programs are generally
disbursed through these organizations which perform new home construction, rehabilitation,
and renovations that comprise the vast majority of investment activity in the neighborhoods.
Although the selected NiB neighborhoods share many similarities, one important distinction
must be made in that Blackwell was subject to an additional urban program, known as
HOPE VI, alongside NiB. HOPE VI was a program designed to raze un￿t homes, without at
6the time creating new construction in their place. Tables 1A and 1B provide a summary of
basic demographic and housing characteristics of the selected neighborhoods using the 2000
census and our housing data before the start of the program in 1998.
Table 1B. Characteristics of the housing stock in NiB neighborhoods
Percent Percent Average Median Price
Neighborhood Vacant Owned Plot Acreage Pricea St. Dev.
Church Hill 21.7 35.7 0.07 14,861 29,244
Blackwell 23.2 32.6 0.09 17,368 16,705
Highland Park-Barton 18.3 40.5 0.14 33,223 24,740
Jackson Ward-Carver 31.5 36.0 0.06 37,914 46,548
Bellemeade 10.8 51.4 0.16 33,881 15,643
City of Richmond 8.4 46.1 0.17 74,394 121,539
a : expressed in 2000 constant dollars
As shown in Figure 1, the selected neighborhoods all fall in the eastern part of the city and
share a heritage dating to Richmond￿ s origins. The city was founded because of its location
at the fall line of the James River, the farthest inland point navigable to ship tra¢ c. Early
development began in this area, but as factories emerged, the neighborhoods in the eastern
portion of the city gradually fell into disfavor and declined over time. This process led to
changes in the demographic makeup of these areas, with higher poverty rates and lower
average home prices, as well as higher percentages of crime relative to citywide averages.
Aside from their similarities in terms of demographics, homes in the selected neighborhoods,
because of their historical ties, also share many elements of style and construction. In
particular, homes in all selected areas consist mostly of row houses of similar sizes, many
constructed of brick. A slight exception is Blackwell and Highland Park, where some homes
are of detached Queen Anne and Victorian styles.
With funding sources in place and neighborhoods identi￿ed, NiB began operations in
July 1999. Prior to start up, teams were formed comprised of city sta⁄ers, community group
representatives, and CDC representatives to review neighborhood redevelopment plans, iden-
tify precise boundaries of investment, known as ￿impact areas￿ , and identify speci￿c homes
for renovation and sites for new home construction. Once speci￿c home projects within
individual impact areas were determined, the CDCs operating in those areas applied for
funds to carry out the projects. Nearly all investment activity consisted of acquisition, de-
molition, rehabilitation, and new construction of housing within NiB impact areas. The
work carried out by the various CDCs varied in impact, re￿ ecting in part the comparative
7strengths of individual organizations, in that speci￿c CDCs had unique relationships with
their home neighborhoods and specialized experience in some categories of construction or
rehabilitation.
Spending under the NiB program began in 1999 (although a small fraction preceded the
o¢ cial start date of the program) and continued through 2004. Over this period, approxi-
mately $14 million was spent in total. Slightly over $11 million came through CDBG and
HOME programs, smaller federal programs and Commonwealth of Virginia monies. LISC
added nearly $3 million. Around $1 million came from other sources, with approximately
half that amount from undocumented sources. Most of the spending took place in the 1999
through 2001 period, with yearly expenditures trailing o⁄ in the later years of the program.
Finally, one of the unique aspects of the study we carry out in this paper relates to the
presence of a neighborhood that was almost included in the NiB program but that did not,
ultimately, received funding. Speci￿cally, the neighborhood of Bellemeade lies in the eastern
portion of the city, south of the James River (see Figure 1). Its makeup and location are
typical of NiB neighborhoods and, according to a former city o¢ cial closely involved with
the NiB selection process, ￿absolutely matched￿the selected neighborhoods in physical and
demographic terms. This is in fact also clear from Tables 1A and 1B. The reason that
Bellemeade did not make the ￿nal cut, he suggests, is that the area did not have active
enough CDCs, so that the channel used to direct NiB investment dollars was mostly absent.
This distinction, however, makes Bellemeade close to an ideal control neighborhood. In
particular, because no NiB investment took place in that neighborhood, and given that its
demographics and housings stock closely match that of the selected NiB neighborhoods, it is
natural to use Bellemeade as a benchmark in gauging changes in neighborhood land values
arising from the NiB program.3
3 A Model of Housing Externalities
This section provides a framework that o⁄ers insight into the types of urban renewal policies
we have just described. More importantly, it helps underscore the importance of housing ex-
ternalities in determining the e⁄ects of these revitalization policies. Consider a neighborhood
represented by N = [￿R;R], where R denotes the neighborhood￿ s edge, with density of land
3A question remains as to why there were fewer CDC￿ s in Bellemeade than in the other neighborhoods
in the ￿rst place, which potentially indicates a lingering selection issue. The results presented in Section 5,
however, suggest that this concern is limited.
8equal to one. All agents living in the neighborhood work at location 0.4 We assume that all
agents are endowed with one unit of time, and that some of this time is spent commuting to
work. Thus, an agent commuting from location ‘ 2 N only works e￿￿j‘j time units, ￿ > 0.
The production technology is linear, and transforms one unit of time into w units of a ￿nal
good.
Agents￿preferences are de￿ned over housing services enjoyed at a given location, denoted
by e H(‘) for an agent living at ‘, and other types of consumption, c(‘). The only good in the
economy can be allocated to either investment in housing or consumption. All agents live on
a lot of size one, which they rent from absentee landlords at rate q(‘). Housing services at a
location are obtained from owning a piece of land and directly improving it, as well as from
the amount of housing services produced nearby. The fact that housing services produced
at a given location a⁄ect housing services enjoyed elsewhere de￿nes a housing externality.
Formally, if H(‘) denotes investments in housing undertaken by an individual living at ‘,
then




￿￿j‘￿sjH(s)ds + H(‘): (1)
Hence, aside from home improvements they make at a given location, individuals also bene￿t
from having nearby housing owned by others that is well-maintained. In particular, housing
services enjoyed at location ‘ re￿ ect in part a weighted average of housing services produced
at neighboring sites, with weights that decline with distance at an exponential rate ￿ > 0.
Agents living at location ‘ spend their income, we￿￿j‘j, on the unit of land they rent at
rate q(‘), housing investments, H(‘), and consumption, c(‘). We assume that individuals
order consumption baskets according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Hence, an agent
living at some location ‘ solves
max
c(‘); H(‘)
u(c(‘); e H(‘)) = c(‘)
￿ e H(‘)
1￿￿; 0 < ￿ < 1; (P‘)
subject to
c(‘) + q(‘) + H(‘) = we
￿￿j‘j; (2)
and





where housing services produced at other locations, H(s), are taken as given. The optimality
conditions associated with problem (P‘) imply that
(1 ￿ ￿)c(‘) = ￿ e H(‘): (3)
4This simplifying assumption ensures symmetry but is otherwise unimportant for the questions we shall
be asking.
9Substituting this condition into the agent￿ s budget constraint (2), and using the equation
describing the externality from housing (1), immediately yields an expression for housing
services obtained at ‘ that depends only on prices and housing services produced elsewhere,
e H(‘) = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
we







3.1 The Neighborhood Equilibrium
There are two key conditions that determine equilibrium allocations in the neighborhood.
First, all agents are identical and can choose freely where to live, including in another
neighborhood if their utility falls below some reservation utility, u. In equilibrium, therefore,
individuals obtain utility u at all locations, which immediately implies that






That is, housing services enjoyed at any location are the same throughout the neighborhood.
It follows from Equation (1) that the function describing housing investments at di⁄erent
sites is a ￿xed point of the following functional equation,




￿￿j‘￿sjH(s)ds; ‘ 2 [￿R;R]: (6)
The second condition needed to determine equilibrium allocations involves a boundary con-
dition for land rents at either edge of the neighborhood, which we denote by qR > 0. From


















H + qR ￿ we
￿￿R. (8)
To summarize, an equilibrium for the neighborhood is a function describing housing invest-
ments at all locations, H(‘), a function describing land rents, q(‘), a level of housing services
H, and a boundary for the neighborhood, R, such that equations (5), (6), (7) and (8) are
satis￿ed.
The solid curves in Figure 2A and 2B depict typical equilibrium housing investment al-
locations, H(‘), and land rents, q(‘), respectively.5 Housing investments are highest near
5The parameter values used in this example are: u = 13:25, ￿ = 0:001, R = 3500, A = 1190, ￿ = 0:368,
w = 25, ￿ = 0:6, and ￿ = 0:00001.
10the boundaries of the neighborhood where externalities from housing are lowest. With lower
externalities from housing at locations away from the neighborhood center, individuals living
at those locations must spend a greater share of their income on direct home improvements in
order to obtain the constant level of housing services H. The fact that housing externalities
are lowest near the neighborhood boundaries also implies that land rents are lowest at those
locations. On a more practical level, observe in Figure 1 that the highlighted neighborhoods
are indeed often bounded by major roads, such as interstates or highways, and other land-
marks that e⁄ectively reduce externalities from housing potentially located outside those
boundaries. The neighborhood of Blackwell, for instance, is bounded by highways to the
west, north, and east, as well as by an industrial railway station in part to the south. Simi-
larly, the neighborhood of Jackson Ward-Carver is bounded by Interstate 64 to the north and
Highway 250 to the south, and adjoins an industrial zone to the east. Although not bounded
by main roads, the land surrounding Highland Park-South Barton Heights is largely free of
housing, composed of a large cemetery to the south, warehouses to the west, and vacant
grounds to the east and north.
3.2 The Neighborhoods-in-Bloom Program
Consider a federally funded neighborhood revitalization program that aims to increase hous-
ing investments at all locations in an area A = [￿r;r] ￿ N by some ￿xed amount ￿ > 0.
Throughout the paper, we refer to A as an ￿ impact area.￿Let Hp(‘) denote the new equilib-
rium housing investment function that emerges after implementation of the policy. Similarly,
let e Hp(‘) describe housing services enjoyed at location ‘ following the program. Because the
reservation utility from living in some other neighborhood is unchanged, and agents can
freely move between neighborhoods, housing services are still given by Equation (5) so that
e Hp(‘) = H. Then, for ‘ 2 NnA, Hp(‘) solves









where the last term in (9) captures externalities generated by the program and obtained at
a location outside the impact area. For locations ‘ 2 A that are directly a⁄ected by the
revitalization policy, we have that













where the last term now re￿ ects the fact that those locations are also the direct recipients
of capital improvements ￿.
11Since H remains unchanged following the urban development program, it follows that
H(‘)p ￿ H(‘) < 0 for all ‘ 2 [￿R;R]. To see this, note from equations (6) and (9), and
abstracting from the direct subsidy, that for ‘ 2 NnA,
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￿r e￿￿jj￿sjds < 1 as well. The direct e⁄ect of subsidies, of course, only serves
to amplify this e⁄ect in the impact area. Put another way, Equation (11) implies that
investment in housing decreases everywhere in the neighborhood, and this decrease is more
pronounced the closer the locations are to the impact area. In this framework, therefore, the
neighborhood revitalization program crowds out private investment in housing. The subsidy
to home improvements in e⁄ect allows agents to enjoy housing services without having to
spend on those services themselves. The implied relaxation of their budget constraint leads
individuals to bid up the price of land so that, in the new equilibrium, higher land rents,
qp(‘), prevail throughout the neighborhood.
The di⁄erence in land rents created by the implementation of the policy, net of the direct
capital improvement ￿, is given by











We have already argued that the ￿rst term in square brackets is negative. The second
term captures positive externalities generated by the capital improvement policy. In this
respect, the size of the exogenous increase in housing investment at each targeted location,
￿, and the extent of the impact area, A, have a ￿rst order positive e⁄ect on land prices.
In contrast, because commuting costs, ￿, and income, w, a⁄ect land rents in the same way
in (7), both before and after the introduction of the policy, these features are essentially
di⁄erenced out and only a⁄ect land prices through changes in H(:) in Equation (12). Note
that since qp(‘)￿q(‘) in (12) is simply the negative of the change in land rents Hp(‘)￿H(‘)
in (11), it immediately follows that qp(‘) ￿ q(‘) > 0. Hence, our assumption of Cobb-
Douglas preferences with elasticity of substitution equal to one (which implies an unchanged
12H following the policy) ensures that the implementation of the revitalization program is
associated with higher land rents. This choice of preferences stems from empirical work on
cities which has found the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation with respect to land and consumption
to ￿t the data well (see Davis and Ortalo-Magne, 2007).
In the end, as a result of the revitalization program, housing investments fall and land
prices rise throughout the neighborhood. Agents consume a constant fraction of housing,
and now that nearby homes o⁄er additional housing services, they prefer to invest less where
they live. The revitalization policy increases the value of location and, therefore, land prices.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Following the positive housing subsidy on a set of locations A, housing in-
vestments decrease at all locations, H(‘)p ￿ H(‘) < 0 8‘ 2 [￿R;R], and land rents
increase at all locations, qp(‘) ￿ q(‘) > 0 8‘ 2 [￿R;R].
The new equilibrium land rents, qp(‘), are described by the dashed curve in Figure 2B. As
we have just argued, these new land rents are everywhere higher in the neighborhood, and
especially when close to the impact area. Figure 2C shows the percentage or log di⁄erence
between post-policy and pre-policy land rents on either side of the center of the impact area,
net of the direct capital improvements brought about by the renewal program. This di⁄er-
ence, therefore, re￿ ects only the propagation of housing externalities across space induced
by the federal housing investment increase.
Given that externalities fall exponentially with distance in this model, increases in land
value in Figure 2C will generally mimic a di⁄usion process as they level out with distance from
the impact area. The rise in land rents is more pronounced over the impact area because a
typical location in that area is mainly surrounded by other locations that received funding for
capital improvements. Hence, a location in A bene￿ts from externalities generated by many
similarly a⁄ected locations nearby. Note, in particular, the steep drop o⁄ in land returns
once we move outside the impact region. At locations near the boundary, di⁄erences in land
rents become mostly ￿ at near zero in Figure 2C. This e⁄ect arises because any one location
near the boundary, contrary to a location in A, is mainly surrounded by other locations that
did not bene￿t from the revitalization program. External e⁄ects from the policy, therefore,
are negligible at those locations. Because externalities generate a two-tier e⁄ect on land rents
across space, changes in land rents produced by the revitalization program will generally be
characterized by a bimodal distribution. This is shown in Figure 2D. Keep in mind, from
Equation (12), that this bimodal aspect of land returns arises independently of the direct
e⁄ect related to capital improvements in A.
134 The Empirical Framework
This section sets up an empirical framework whose aim is to help us identify the extent to
which the e⁄ects of the NiB programs, in practice, propagated to non-targeted sites. We
are also interested in whether we can establish empirically that these external e⁄ects decline
with distance in a way suggested by Figure 2C. If so, we also wish to a gauge how far the
e⁄ects of NiB programs were able to extend in this case.
We denote a location in the city of Richmond by ‘ = (x;y) 2 R2, where x and y are
Cartesian coordinates. Let p represent the (log) price of a home per square foot of land in
the city of Richmond. Our analysis begins with the following semiparametric hedonic price
equation,
p = Z￿ + q(‘) + "; (13)
where Z is a k￿element vector of conditioning housing attributes such that cov(Zj‘) = ￿zj‘,
q(‘) is the component of home prices directly related to location, and " is a random variable
such that E("j‘;Z) = 0 and var("j‘;Z) = ￿2
". While this semi-log speci￿cation is standard
in the analysis of real estate data, we di⁄er somewhat in that we try to remain ￿ exible with
respect to the form of q(‘). In particular, we do not assume that q(‘) lies in given parametric
family.6
We are interested in assessing the e⁄ects of NiB policies on the component of prices
related to location, q(‘), in the various targeted neighborhoods described previously. This
suggests estimating Equation (13) both before and after the NiB policies come into e⁄ect.
Because our concern is with assessing the extent of residential externalities, we omit obser-
vations on homes that directly bene￿ted from NiB funding in our estimation. Although our
model predicts that the types of renewal programs considered here generally crowd out of
private investment, it is conceivable that these programs induced a reshu› ing of heteroge-
nous populations across neighborhoods, consistent with gentri￿cation, that is not captured
in our framework. In particular, a higher income household that decided to relocate to an
impact area and further invested in home improvements would have very likely used some
NiB funding (since the program aimed to precisely subsidize this type of investment). As
such, simply subtracting public home improvements at that location would overstate the
external e⁄ect of the policy on land prices. Because we have no way of measuring any ad-
ditional private spending on home improvements at locations that received NiB funding, a
6The assumption of separability between Z and q(‘) is made for computational simplicity, and abstracts
from a potential complementarity between location and housing attributes. See Ho (1995), and Anglin and
Gencay (1996), for alternative applications of the semiparametric hedonic pricing model to the real estate
market.
14conservative strategy is to omit the observation altogether.
Some key questions that the analysis will attempt to uncover are: i) How did the price
of land change in each of the neighborhoods in Figure 1, say from q(‘) to qp(‘), at sites not
directly targeted by the NiB revitalization projects? ii) Can we relate this change to some
notion of distance from a focal point in a given impact area? In particular, do the ￿ndings
related to the neighborhoods targeted for revitalization indicate external e⁄ects that dissipate
with distance? Conversely, given the absence of an impact area in the control neighborhood
of Bellemeade, are land price changes in that neighborhood more uniform across space?
4.1 Data Description
Our dataset stems from two sources. First, the city of Richmond collected records of all
properties that bene￿ted from NiB funding between 1999 and 2004. These records include
the geo-coded location of those properties as well as the amount and type of funds that it re-
ceived. Second, we also obtain from the city of Richmond a geo-coded listing of all properties
sold between 1993 and 2004 that includes information on condition and age, construction de-
scriptors (e.g. exterior materials, type of heating, etc.), and various dimensional attributes
(e.g. lot size, size of living area, etc.). Since the NiB revitalization programs speci￿cally
targeted residential properties, we remove from our sample all non-residential properties,
mainly commercial buildings. We also delete listings that were likely incorrectly recorded,
including homes listed as being built before 1800 and homes whose living area is recorded
as less than 250 square feet. Because all of our data is geo-coded, we are able to cross-check
our two datasets and remove any property that directly bene￿ted from NiB funding. In this
sense, we aim to measure only the external e⁄ects associated with the NiB programs. In all,
we have 44;412 sales observations.
Descriptive statistics of the housing characteristics for all years are reported in Table 2.
These characteristics include the furnished square footage of a house, the number of years
since the house was ￿rst built, its plot acreage, and the number of bathrooms available (with
half baths counting as one half). We also include binary variables that indicate whether the
house has central air conditioning, whether its exterior is brick or vinyl, and whether it is
heated using gas or hot water. The city of Richmond also assigns condition grades to each
house, which we capture using binary variables to indicate whether a house was assessed
in good condition, poor condition, or very poor condition. Finally, we include among our
conditioning variables, Z, a set of time dummies that capture secular city-wide increases
in home prices driven by aggregate factors such as city population growth or interest rates
changes.
15Table 2. Data Summary
Variable Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Sales Pricea 74394 121539 11 8946680
Air Conditioning 0.5716 0.4949 0 1
Brick Exterior 0.4611 0.4985 0 1
Vinyl Exterior 0.0404 0.1970 0 1
Gas Heating 0.1267 0.3326 0 1
Hot Water Heating 0.2167 0.4120 0 1
Square Footage 1664.9 1190.3 319 63233
Age (in years) 63.78 26.46 0 205
Acreage 0.2337 0.3506 0.012 37.67
Good Condition 0.1789 0.3833 0 1
Poor Condition 0.0196 0.1385 0 1
Very Poor Condition 0.0137 0.1162 0 1
No. Bathrooms 1.546 1.245 0 1
a : Expressed in constant 2000 dollars.
4.2 Estimation of the Parametric E⁄ects
In order to estimate the non-parametric component of Equation (13), q(‘), we must ￿rst
address the estimation of the parametric e⁄ects, ￿. Let n denote the number of observations
on home prices and k the number of variables in Z. A popular approach, pioneered by
Robinson (1988), proceeds in two steps. In the ￿rst step, non-parametric (kernel) estimates
of E(pj‘) and E(Zj‘) are constructed. Since Equation (13) implies that
p ￿ E(pj‘) = [Z ￿ E(Zj‘)]￿ + "; (14)
the second step involves replacing the conditional means in (14) by these non-parametric
functions and estimating ￿ by least squares. Robinson (1988) shows that estimates of ￿
obtained in this way are
p
n consistent. Because of the size of our dataset, and given that
separate non-parametric regressions are required for each housing attribute in Z, this method
proves onerous in our case. To circumvent this problem, Yatchew (1997, 2001) proposes a
di⁄erencing approach that we adopt in this paper.
The basic idea behind Yatchew￿ s (1997, 2001) estimation strategy is to re-order the data,
(p1;Z1;‘1), (p2;Z2;‘2), ... , (pn;Zn;‘n) so that the ‘￿s are close, in which case di⁄erencing
tends to remove the non-parametric e⁄ects. In particular, ￿rst-di⁄erencing of (13) gives
pi ￿ pi￿1 = (Zi ￿ Zi￿1)￿ + q(‘i) ￿ q(‘i￿1) + "i ￿ "i￿1. (15)
16Assuming that a Lipschitz condition holds for q, jq(‘a)￿q(‘b)j ￿ Ljj‘a￿‘bjj, the di⁄erence in
non-parametric component in (15) vanishes asymptotically.7 Yatchew (1997) shows that the
OLS estimator of ￿ using the di⁄erenced data (i.e. the projection of pi￿pi￿1 on Zi￿Zi￿1) is
also
p
n consistent. This estimator of ￿, however, achieves only 2=3 e¢ ciency relative to the
one produced by Robinson￿ s method. This can be improved dramatically by way of higher-
order di⁄erencing. Speci￿cally, de￿ne ￿p to be the (n ￿ m) ￿ 1 vector whose elements are
[￿p]i =
Pm
s=0 dspi￿s, ￿Z to be the (n￿m)￿k matrix with entries [￿Z]ij =
Pm
s=0 dsZi￿s;j,
and similarly for ￿". The ds￿ s denote constant di⁄erencing weights and m governs the order
of di⁄erencing. We thus estimate a more general version of Equation (15),
￿p = ￿Z￿ +
m X
s=0
dsq(‘i￿s) + ￿"; i = m + 1;:::;n; (16)
where the following two conditions are imposed on the di⁄erencing coe¢ cients, d0;:::;dm :
m X
s=0





s = 1: (17)
The ￿rst condition ensures that di⁄erencing removes the non-parametric e⁄ect in (13) as
the sample size increases and the re-ordered ‘￿ s become ￿close￿ . The second condition is a
normalization restriction that implies that the transformed residual in (16) has variance ￿2
".
When the di⁄erencing weights are chosen optimally, the di⁄erence estimator, ￿￿, obtained
by regressing ￿p on ￿Z approaches asymptotic e¢ ciency by selecting m su¢ ciently large.8
We use m = 10 which produces coe¢ cient estimates that are approximately 95 percent
e¢ cient when using optimal di⁄erencing weights. Note that, as a practical matter, the initial
re-ordering of the ‘￿ s is not unambiguous here since ‘ 2 R2. We re-order locations using a
path created by a Hamiltonian nearest neighbor algorithm and, for our dataset, this yields
a mean distance between locations, 1=n
P
jj‘i ￿ ‘i￿1j, that is 24 to 28 times smaller than
that obtained by simply re-ordering locations according to their x or y coordinate (i.e. the
wrap-around method)9.
7Suppose that locations constitute a uniform grid on the unit square (the re-scaling is without loss of
generality). Each point may then be thought of as residing in an area of 1=n, and the distance between
re-odered adjacent observations, jj‘i ￿ ‘i￿1jj, is 1=
p
n.




s dsds+k)2 subject to the constraints in
(17). See Yatchew (1997).
9The starting point when using the nearest neighbor approach is arbitrary but has little implications for
our results.
174.3 Non-Parametric Kernel Estimation of q(‘)
Denote by Y the price of a home ￿purged￿of its contribution from housing characteristics,
where Y is obtained using ￿rst stage estimates, Y = p￿Zb ￿￿, and construct the data (Y1;‘1),
(Y2;‘2),...,(Yn;‘n). Because b ￿￿ is a consistent estimator of ￿, standard kernel estimation
methods applied to purged home prices yield consistent estimates of q(‘).






In other words, the component of home prices directly related to location, ‘j, is a weighted-













and K( ) is a symmetric real function such that
R
jK( )jd  < 1 and
R
K( )d  = 1.
Thus, we may choose to attach greater weight to observations on prices of homes located
near ‘j rather than far away by suitable choice of the function K. In particular, as in much
of the literature, our estimation is carried out using the Epanechnikov kernel. The distance
between location ‘j and some other location ‘i in the city is simply measured as a Euclidean
distance in feet. An implication of the Epanechnikov kernel is that prices of homes located
more than a distance of h feet from ‘j will receive a zero weight in the estimation of q(‘j).
In that sense, the bandwidth h has a very natural interpretation in this case.10
The NiB programs were ￿rst implemented in 1999 and nearly phased out by 2004. Con-
sequently, we estimate Equation (13) over two subsamples, 1993 ￿ 1998, the period prior to
NiB coming into e⁄ect, and 1999 ￿ 2004, the post revitalization period for which we have
data. The ￿rst and second subsamples contain 18102 and 26310 observations respectively.
Ultimately, we wish to capture increases in the price of land at di⁄erent locations between
1998 and 2004. Hence, we set the base year for the time dummies in Z as the last year in
each subsample period. All prices are measured in 2000 constant dollars, and we estimate
land prices using observations over the entire city of Richmond.
10In practice, the estimation of q(‘) is a⁄ected to a greater degree by the choice of bandwidth rather than
the choice of kernel. See diNardo and Tobias (2001) for a detailed discussion. In this case, the bandwith is
chosen by means of Cross-Validation. Hence, we select h so that it solves minh CV (h) = n￿1 Pn
j=1[Yj ￿
e qh(‘j)]2, where e qh(‘j) = n￿1 Pn
i6=j Whi(‘j)Yi:
185 Empirical results
This section reviews our ￿ndings. We present estimates of the semiparametric hedonic price
regression (13) and illustrate what they imply for city-wide land prices prior to the imple-
mentation of NiB. This allows us to compute changes in land values for the neighborhoods
targeted for revitalization and describe how these changes vary as we move away from the
impact area. We then compare our ￿ndings for the targeted neighborhoods with those in our
control neighborhood. This comparison lets us compute the total e⁄ect of the NiB program
relative to a benchmark where no such public investment took place. Finally, we use this
evidence to calibrate the model of housing externalities presented in Section 3.
Table 3 presents estimates of the parametric components of Equation (13). Virtually all
housing characteristics in Table 3 are statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent critical level,
and the large majority of these attributes is signi￿cant at the 1 percent level in both samples.
In addition, both speci￿cations achieve a surprisingly good ￿t for cross-sectional data.11
Coe¢ cients associated with the sale date are signi￿cant over and above prices being
measured in constant dollars. In the post 1998 period, in particular, our ￿ndings suggest
a considerable real run up in home prices in the city of Richmond (as with many other
U.S. cities over the same time period). We estimate separate semiparametric hedonic price
speci￿cations over the pre and post 1998 period to account for possible changes to the
valuation of housing attributes triggered by the implementation of the revitalization policy
or any other city policy or shock. The housing coe¢ cients shown in Table 1, however, tend
to be relatively similar across subsamples. Alternative estimates that hold the coe¢ cients on
housing attributes constant across subperiods have immaterial implications for the results
we present below.
Of central interest are the nonparametric estimates of land prices, q(‘), in both the
targeted neighborhoods and the control neighborhood.12 Prior to the start of the NiB project,
we estimate land prices that in 1998 averaged $5.97 per square foot in the neighborhood of
Church Hill, $6.38 in Highland Park-South Barton Heights, and $5.17 in Blackwell. In
contrast, we estimate higher land prices for the city as a whole, with a mean of $8.29 per
square foot, and land prices that are as high as $100 per square foot in the more a› uent parts
of Richmond. The large majority of these highly priced sites form part of a historical district
known as the Fan located in the center of Richmond. Because the neighborhood of Jackson
Ward-Carver adjoins the Fan district, the local averaging implied by kernel estimation gives




i=1(￿pi ￿ ￿Zib ￿￿)
2 !P ￿2
". Hence, we compute R2 as 1 ￿ s2
￿=s2
p.
12Land prices are estimated on a grid containing the coordinates of home sales in our pre-policy sample.
Using the grid corresponding to post-policy home sales instead does not change our ￿ndings.
19land prices that have a mean of $12 per square foot in that neighborhood. In contrast,
estimated land prices in the control neighborhood of Bellemeade fall well within the range
of the other three NiB neighborhoods, with a slightly lower mean at $4.71 per square foot.
Table 3. Estimates of the parametric e⁄ects on home prices
1993-1998 Period 1999-2004 Period
Variable Coe⁄. t-statistics Coe⁄. t-statistics
1993 -0.059 -3.453 1999 -0.428 -30.206
1994 -0.039 -2.381 2000 -0.380 -27.401
1995 -0.048 -2.924 2001 -0.303 -22.513
1996 -0.036 -2.203 2002 -0.232 -17.316
1997 -0.029 -1.874 2003 -0.129 9.718
Air Cond. 0.094 7.752 Air Cond. 0.078 7.900
Brick Exterior 0.152 11.386 Brick Exterior 0.186 16.173
Vinyl Exterior -0.290 -8.636 Vinyl Exterior -0.187 8.250
Gas Heating 0.092 5.610 Gas Heating 0.154 10.317
Hot Water Heating 0.101 6.624 Hot Water Heating 0.066 5.210
Sq. Ft.a 0.055 6.237 Sq. Ft. 0.027 5.496
Ageb -0.007 0.218 Age 0.149 5.972
Acreage -0.815 -37.652 Acreage -0.423 -34.920
Good Cond. 0.095 6.524 Good Cond. 0.137 11.087
Poor Cond. -0.510 -11.864 Poor Cond. -0.375 12.990
Very Poor Cond. -0.867 -17.327 Very Poor Cond. -0.613 -17.449
No. Bathrooms 0.003 0.479 No. Bathrooms 0.010 2.251
No. obs. 18102 26310
R2 0.64 R2 0.68
a : measured in 1000 sq. ft.; b : measured in 100 years.
A contour map of the price of land per square foot for the city of Richmond before NiB is
shown in Figure 4. It is clear from the ￿gure that the NiB neighborhoods are associated with
some of the lowest land prices in the entire city.13 Despite its relatively small area of 60 square
miles, Figure 4 suggests considerable variation in land prices throughout Richmond. Because
lot sizes are relatively homogenous throughout Richmond at around 0:1 acres, our estimates
suggest lot prices that vary from $20,000 in the neighborhoods targeted by NiB to $435,000
in the more well-o⁄ districts. Table 4 focuses on the NiB neighborhoods more speci￿cally
13To capture policy e⁄ects that potentially extend beyond the areas intially targed by NiB, we present our
results for a broader de￿nition of neighborhood described in Section 5.1.
20and gives estimated land prices per square foot at di⁄erent percentiles in comparison to the
city as whole.
Table 4. Pre-NiB land price per square foot
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Neighborhood Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
Church Hill 0.81 1.84 5.21 13.32 21.02
Blackwell 0.76 1.84 3.83 7.04 12.15
Highland Park-Barton 1.29 2.61 5.22 8.05 11.59
Jackson Ward-Carver 2.22 4.85 11.77 21.66 31.36
Bellemeade 1.87 2.89 4.71 6.42 8.13
City of Richmond 3.09 5.11 8.29 14.94 27.40
5.1 The Return to Land in the Neighborhoods Targeted by NiB
To relate our empirical ￿ndings to the theory in Section 3 more closely, we now explore
several key aspects of the data. First, we explore whether changes in land value in the four
selected neighborhoods decrease with distance in a way suggested by Figure 2C? Second,
given the absence of an impact area in the control neighborhood of Bellemeade, we ask
whether changes in land value in that neighborhood are both lower and more uniform across
space.
To answer these questions, there are two aspects of the empirical framework that we
must ￿rst reconcile with the theory presented in Section 3. First, in contrast to our model,
targeted neighborhoods in practice generally have more than one impact area. Second, for
ease of presentation, we must tackle the issue of how to present our estimates for ￿q(‘),
where ‘ 2 R2, in terms of distance from a focal point, ￿q(d), where d 2 R, analogously to
Figure 2C. By way of example, we use the neighborhood of Blackwell to discuss our approach
to both issues, and proceed similarly in the other targeted neighborhoods.
Figure 3 shows the targeted neighborhood of Blackwell, denoted by N. Within N, let
Ai represent the cluster of locations that were the direct recipient of NiB funding. There are
2 such clusters shown in Figure 3, which essentially constitute impact areas. Formally, the
partitioning of directly targeted locations into separate clusters satis￿es a K-means criterion.





n2Ai j‘n ￿￿ij, where ‘n and ￿i are a location and the geometric centroid of Ai
21respectively.14 We de￿ne the funding center of an impact area as a convex combination of
the locations that received NiB funding within that cluster. These are shown as c1 and c2 in
Figure 3. The weights in that combination are given by the relative amounts of NiB funds
spent at the di⁄erent locations. In that sense, this funding center represents a focal point of
the revitalization policy in a given impact area.
In general, it is possible that a location in between two impact areas, such as between
A1 and A2 in Figure 3, bene￿t from externalities related to both sets of funded locations
simultaneously. In that case, for simplicity, we attribute any measured external e⁄ect on land
values to the closest impact area. Thus, for each location ‘ in N, we compute the distance
from ‘ to the center of the closest cluster, d(‘) = minifjj‘ ￿ cijjg, where ci is the center of
Ai. We can then rank these distances from smallest to largest. In particular, the variable
d(‘) represents a convenient mapping from R2 to R that, despite the existence of several
impact areas in a given neighborhood, captures some notion of distance from a central point
of the policy experiment. It also allows us to plot land price changes with respect to distance
from this focal point, ￿q(d), and to examine whether changes in land value indeed fall as we
move away from the policy experiment (i.e. as d increases). In order to capture any external
e⁄ects that potentially exist beyond the targeted neighborhoods in Figure 1, we extend each
neighborhood to encompass locations such that d(‘) covers a radius of 3500 feet. In doing
so, however, we are careful not to cross natural boundaries such as highways, railroad tracks,
industrial zones, etc. that often arise before reaching 3500 feet. In practice, therefore, this
radius generally represents the broadest de￿nition of a neighborhood that does not infringe
on other neighborhoods with distinctly di⁄erent demographics or housing characteristics.
Figure 5 illustrates (kernel-smoothed) distributions of estimated land price changes,
￿q(‘), in each of the NiB neighborhoods. Recall that q(‘) is estimated from log prices
so that ￿q(‘) measures percent changes which we express at an annual rate. The distribu-
tion of estimated changes in land value generally depicts positive returns in all four cases,
although the spread and mean of these distributions vary. The question is whether, as in
Figure 2C, these land price increases become smaller as one moves further away from the
impact area.
Figure 6 illustrates the behavior of estimated changes in land prices per square foot with
respect to distance from the impact area, ￿q(d). It is apparent that in all four cases, the
returns to land fall as the distance from the policy experiment increases.15 Externalities
14Although this problem potentially yields multiple solutions, the clusters of funded locations are su¢ -
ciently separated in our case that this is not an issue.
15The curves shown in each panel of Figure 6 are Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimates computed as described
in section 4. The 95 percent con￿dence bands are based on standard errors at each distance, d, computed
22are more pronounced close to the funding center and fall steeply as one moves away from
locations in the impact area. In the neighborhood of Church Hill (Figure 6A), most of the
returns to land are concentrated around the upper tier, which explains a mode annual return
of around 12 percent in Figure 5A. In contrast, in the neighborhood of Blackwell (Figure
6B), most of the returns to land are located near the lower tier so that the mode return in
Figure 5B is around 4:5 percent. Both Figures 5 and 6 suggest perceivable di⁄erences in the
way that each neighborhood was a⁄ected by the NiB program, with mean annualized returns
that vary from 5:93 percent in Blackwell to 9:71 percent in Church Hill. Thus, we examine
more closely below the relationship between the size of the capital improvement program
in a particular neighborhood and its overall gain in value from externalities. Recall from
Equation (12) that both the size of the impact area and the amount of funding for home
improvements have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on price changes. It remains that in all four cases, the
neighborhoods targeted for revitalization appear to have fared appreciably better than the
control neighborhood of Bellemeade whose mean return of 3:88 percent is shown as the ￿ at
solid line in Figure 6. Strikingly, observe that land returns in the targeted neighborhoods
tend to level out at the control neighborhood mean as the distance from the center of the
impact area reaches 2500 to 3500 feet.
Figure 7 shows contour maps of the returns to land in each of the NiB neighborhoods.
In each neighborhood, distinct land return ￿ hills￿are clearly visible.16 Furthermore, the
locations we identify as centers of the policy experiment (i.e. the convex combination of
funded locations) tend to be situated near the peaks of those ￿ hills￿ . In some cases one
center tends to dominate; as in Church Hill where the southern policy center is located
right at the top of the highest hill in land returns. Given the absence of an impact area in
Bellemeade, a key question then is: are changes in land value in the control neighborhood
lower and more uniform across locations unlike those shown in Figure 6 and 7?
5.2 Comparisons with the Control Neighborhood of Bellemeade
Figures 8A and 8B illustrate the behavior of changes in land value in the control neighborhood
of Bellemeade. Figure 8A shows changes in the return to land as a function of distance from
the centroid of the neighborhood (since Bellemeade does not contain an impact area), while









h ), bK =
R
K(u)du, and n is the number of observations in
each panel.
16The north-eastern end of Blackwell consists mainly of an industrial park with some scattered residences.
No sales were recorded in that area over our sample period.
23￿gure that the returns to land are more uniform and lower in Bellemeade than in the NiB
neighborhoods. The fact that land returns are more uniform across the control neighborhood
is also clear from the contour plot shown in Figure 9. The returns in Bellemeade are also more
concentrated around the mean (the solid line in Figure 8A) than those in the neighborhoods
in bloom and, in some cases, are even negative.
It seems clear from Figure 6 and Figure 8A that the neighborhoods targeted for revi-
talization generally performed better than the control neighborhood in terms of changes in
land value. On average, land prices increased by 3:88 percent at an annual rate between
1998 and 2004 in Bellemeade. This roughly implies a 24 percent increase over this six-year
period. In contrast, mean annual land prices increased by 9:71 percent in Church Hill, 5:93
percent in Blackwell, 6:60 percent in Highland Park-South Barton Heights, and 8:65 percent
in the neighborhood of Jackson Ward-Carver. Moreover, Figure 6 indicates that sites near
the (funding) center of the impact area experienced returns on land of 12 to 15 percent in
each of the NiB neighborhoods. At the upper end, therefore, these returns represent almost
a doubling of land prices over the period 1998 to 2004 compared to just a 24 percent increase
in Bellemeade. Finally, observe that consistent with the absence of any targeted programs in
our control neighborhood, changes in land values in Bellemeade display much less variation
than in the NiB neighborhoods.
Given the size of the land returns estimated in the NiB neighborhoods relative to Belle-
meade, it is natural to ask whether these external gains may have been driven not only by the
revitalization policies put in place but also by simultaneous increases in private investments,
potentially associated with a new population moving into the NiB neighborhoods, triggered
by the renewal program. Several aspects of the analysis suggest that this consideration plays
a limited role in this case.
Under the assumptions maintained in Section 3, recall that the model predicted a crowd-
ing out of private investments following the renewal program rather than a corresponding
increase in private home improvements. This result stems from agents being able to move
freely between neighborhoods but also from the assumption that they are identical (and have
Cobb-Douglas preferences). In practice, of course, the revitalization policies may have pro-
duced a reshu› ing of population across neighborhoods such that higher income households
moved into the targeted areas and bid up the price of land. This process, in fact, often
precisely describes gentri￿cation. If these higher income households also carried out home
improvements, the estimated returns on land shown in Figure 6 overstate the external e⁄ects
induced by the revitalization policies. However, accounting for a simultaneous increase in
income, w, (to re￿ ect a changing population) in addition to public investments, ￿, would
shift the entire land return gradient, qp(‘) ￿ q(‘), in Figure 2B upwards. Returns to land
24near the boundary of the neighborhood, R, in Figure 2B would also shift upward if the new
population invested in housing outside the impact area.
In contrast to these predictions, what is striking in Figure 6 is that changes in land value
in the NiB neighborhoods eventually level out to match the returns estimated in Bellemeade.
Recall, in particular, that land returns in the control neighborhood are relatively even around
the mean in Figure 8A. Nothing in our estimation procedure is designed to generate or force
these results. In addition, this ￿nding suggests that any lingering selection issues associated
with the control neighborhood are likely to be minor. Put another way, far enough away
from the programs, the targeted neighborhoods tend to behave very much like the control
neighborhood.
Finally, there are two other observations that suggest that our results are not driven by
simultaneous increases in private investments by way of gentri￿cation. First, anyone moving
into a targeted neighborhood after 1998, and privately investing in home improvements,
would most likely have taken advantage of the NiB program since the goal of the program
was precisely to subsidize that investment. As such, the observation would have been omitted
from our sample. Second, the trend in the overall volume of sales in the NiB neighborhoods
did not appreciably change before and after the implementation of the NiB program. Any
reshu› ing of population across neighborhoods, therefore, would have been limited.
5.3 Calibration and the Rate of Decline in Housing Externalities
In order to determine more directly what Figure 6 implies for the speed at which externalities
dissipate with distance, we now proceed with a calibration of the model in Section 3 that
gives us some sense of the size of the parameter ￿. In accordance with CPI weights, we set
the share of income spent on housing, 1 ￿ ￿, to 0:32. Analogously to the rate of interest
in a dynamic framework, the level of wages in our model determines the time period tied
to the ￿ ow of consumption services and housing investments. Thus, we set a daily wage of
w = 80 which corresponds to ten dollars an hour and would be typical for residents of an
NiB neighborhood. We set the radius of each neighborhood, R, to 3500 feet consistent with
Figure 6. To calibrate the radius of the impact area, r, we estimate the total size of impact
areas in each neighborhood, A, and set r =
p
(A=￿). This yields an impact area radius of
1085 feet in Church Hill, 1190 feet in Blackwell, 1365 feet in Highland Park-South Barton
Heights, and 1400 feet in Jackson Ward-Carver. If R is measured in feet, then the parameter
￿ in Section 3 refers to the amount of spending per foot in the impact area. Note, however,
that only some of each neighborhood is composed of residential land. To compute residential
area in a given impact region, therefore, we ￿rst multiply the number of residential units in
25the corresponding neighborhood by their mean acreage, which gives us an estimate of total
residential acreage in that neighborhood. To obtain residential acreage within an impact
area, we then multiply total residential acreage by the ratio of the size of an impact area,
￿r2, to total neighborhood area, ￿R2. We have available the amount of NiB funds disbursed
in each neighborhood. Hence, we can approximate ￿ in a given neighborhood as
￿ =
Total Funding in Neighborhood
No. of Units ￿ Mean Unit Acreage ￿ ￿r2
￿R2
:
However, since the average size of a typical NiB plot in the data is around one tenth of an
acre (which correspond to 4356 square feet), and funding took place over a six-year period
(or 6 ￿ 365 days), an appropriately scaled value for ￿ is e ￿ = ￿ ￿ ( 4356
6￿365). This calculation
yields NiB spending per unit area of $6:48 in Church Hill, $5:61 in Blackwell, $2:46 in
Highland Park-South Barton Heights, and $5:96 in Jackson Ward-Carver. Finally, because
each neighborhood is small relative to the city as a whole, we assume that all residents in a
neighborhood face the same commuting costs. Thus, we set ￿ = 0 and interpret w as a wage
net of commuting. This leaves only the parameter u, which we set to 33. The implied land
rent at the edge, qR, is then around 26 dollars per day per acre, or equivalently 780 dollars
a month for a typical lot.
The solid curves in Figure 10 depict land returns predicted from our model in each neigh-
borhood when ￿ = 0:0007. Given this value of ￿, the model does relatively well in replicating
the nonparametric estimates from Figure 6, with the exception of Blackwell. Aside from
di⁄erences in the geography of each NiB neighborhood, the discrepancy in Blackwell likely
re￿ ects di⁄erences in the e⁄ectiveness of CDCs across neighborhoods. As indicated in Section
2, variations across CDCs often result in disparities in the quality of capital improvements,
in particular home renovations, generated by a dollar of NiB funding. These disparities, in
particular, arise from ties between a given CDC and speci￿c contractors or input suppliers.
In addition, recall from Section 2 that Blackwell is unique relative to the other neighborhoods
in that, simultaneously with NiB, the Hope VI program in that neighborhood was actively
engaged in eradicating housing stock deemed ￿un￿t￿but without, at the time, replacing
it with new construction. Interestingly, Figure 10 suggests that any di⁄erences in the way
CDCs operate seem of second order in the other three neighborhoods. In Blackwell, the
amount of NiB funding per square foot comes to $5:61 per square foot. Assuming that this
funding translated instead into $3:10 of e⁄ective home improvements relative to the other
three neighborhoods (i.e. a ratio of 1 to 1:81), the model would have produced the dotted
curve in Figure 10B. Put another way, we think of the negative externalities generated by
the simultaneous destruction of housing stock in Blackwell by the HOPE VI program as
o⁄setting the e⁄ectiveness of an NiB dollar by about 45 cents. More generally, a value of
260:0007 for ￿ implies external e⁄ects from housing services that fall by half approximately
every 990 feet. Note that the model does well in capturing the total magnitude of the e⁄ect
arising from externalities, namely the di⁄erence between land rent returns at the center of
the neighborhood and its boundary.
Our ￿ndings, therefore, suggests externalities that dissipate somewhat more slowly with
distance than estimated in previous work. In particular, Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, and Schill
(2006), using data from a ten-year residential investment program in New York City, ￿nd
residential externalities lasting out to 2000 feet from a project site, with stronger e⁄ects in
poor neighborhoods similar to those in this study. Santiago, Galster and Tatian (2001) ￿nd
e⁄ects on house prices at 1000 to 2000 feet from a project site, though the investments in that
paper are speci￿c to public housing, not simply housing investment. Ding, Simons and Baku
(2000), and Simons, Quercia and Maric (1998), examining CDC investments in Cleveland,
￿nd price e⁄ects that dissipate between 300 and 500 feet from a project site, though their
methodology indicates that distances further than 500 feet were not investigated. In contrast
to our investigation, all of these papers estimate house prices (rather than land values) using
parametric hedonic regressions rather than the nonparametric approach adopted in this
paper.
5.4 Urban Revitalization Programs and Gains in Land Value
This section examines more closely the relationship between the size of the NiB program
implemented in a speci￿c neighborhood and its overall gain in land value. In particular,
while we have the amount of funding received in each of the concerned neighborhood between
1998 and 2004, we wish to arrive at an estimate of overall land gains over that period for
comparison.
Table 5A Neighborhood land values in 1998
Neighborhood No. of units Median plot value Neighborhood value
Jackson Ward 2913 33,338 97,113,594
Highland Park 3471 42,170 146,372,070
Church Hill 2520 21,136 53,262,720
Blackwell 1411 31,081 43,855,291
From the city of Richmond, one can obtain the number of residential units in each of
the targeted neighborhoods. These are shown in the ￿rst column of Table 5A. Although
consistent data on lot sizes for each of these units is unavailable, we can compute the median
land value of a lot in each of the neighborhoods from our dataset. In particular, we have lot
27sizes for homes that have sold in each neighborhood which we can multiply by our estimated
price per square foot land, q(‘), at each corresponding location. Multiplying the number of
units in a given neighborhood by its median plot value then gives us an estimate of total
neighborhood value in 1998. These are shown in the last column of Table 5A. Note that
there are considerable variations in neighborhood values. The median plot value in Highland
Park-South Barton Heights, for instance, is roughly twice as expensive as in Church Hill prior
to the revitalization policy, with roughly 1:4 times the number of units.
Table 5B Overall land gains and the size of urban revitalization programs
Neighborhood Excess Return Neighborhood Gain NiB Funding Gain:Funding Ratio
Jackson Ward 4.77 27,793,911 4,127,636 6.73
Highland Park 2.72 23,887,922 4,261,211 5.61
Church Hill 5.84 18,663,257 3,129,187 5.96
Blackwell 2.05 5,394,201 2,533,243 2.13
To compute overall land gains in the targeted neighborhoods, the ￿rst column of Table
5B gives the (annualized) mean excess return to land in each neighborhood relative to Belle-
meade. Given the value of land shown in Table 5A for each neighborhood, we can readily
compute its overall gain between 1998 and 2004. These gains are shown in the second col-
umn of Table 5B. The last column in Table 5B then shows the ratio of this overall land gain
to the amount of NiB funding received for each neighborhood. Surprisingly, these ratios
are quite close in three of the four neighborhoods at about 5:5 to 6. The ratio in Black-
well is considerably lower, however, which explains the di¢ culty in matching the returns for
that neighborhood in the calibration exercise carried out earlier. As indicated previously,
variations in CDC￿ s across neighborhoods and the fact that the Hope VI program was in
the process of razing un￿t homes in Blackwell, without at the time replacing it with new
construction, made that neighborhood somewhat unique. In any case, it remains that to-
tal increases in land value in each neighborhood (Table 5B, column 2) generally re￿ ect the
intensity of the NiB program in that neighborhood (Table 5B, column 3).
At this stage, it is absolutely crucial to recognize that our results, both in terms of theory
and the empirical work, depend importantly on the exogeneity of NiB funding. Speci￿cally,
it matters critically that NiB expenditures were ￿nanced from sources exclusively outside
Richmond. One cannot, therefore, expect the ratios of land gains to funding shown in
Table 5B to obtain more generally as the size of revitalization programs increases. Broader
programs are less likely to be funded solely from external sources. Moreover, when the funds
that ￿nance revitalization policies are raised from local taxes, externalities will be positive
in the targeted neighborhoods but negative in areas where higher taxes lead to a reduction
28in housing investments. In practice, this reduction often arises by way of population moving
outside the city boundaries to escape the increase in taxes. In that sense, the ratios of gains
in land value to funding in Table 5B are best interpreted as upper bounds.
As a ￿nal thought experiment, we can compare the results shown in the last column of
Table 5B with a more direct implication of the model in Section 3. Speci￿cally, consider the
e⁄ects generated by $1 of capital improvements spent at the center of an impact area. If
externalities from housing services decline exponentially with distance in the way described
in Equation (1), the external e⁄ect obtained a distance s away from that location is given
by ￿e￿￿s. Thus, the aggregate externality obtained within a radius R of where the dollar is







￿￿sdsd￿ = 2￿(1 ￿ e
￿￿R)); (20)
which is bounded between 0 and 2￿ for given ￿ and R. When R is 3500 feet, as suggested
by Figure 6, and ￿ = 0:0007, as suggested by our calibration exercise, ￿ = 5:74. This result
coincides well with the magnitudes calculated in Table 5B for the three neighborhoods that
were not simultaneously subject to additional housing programs.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we presented and interpreted evidence of housing externalities. Our ￿ndings
suggest that housing externalities are large, fall by half approximately every 990 feet, and
considerably amplify the e⁄ects of revitalization programs. The evidence we uncover in this
paper can be used, in conjunction with a model of the type we provide, to evaluate and design
urban renewal policies. More generally, having estimates of the size and rate of decline of
housing externalities is central to the results of any such policy exercise.
We estimate that a dollar of home improvement generated between $2 and $6 in land
value by way of externalities in the neighborhoods of interest. The type of revitalization
policies considered here, therefore, appear to have been an excellent investment for the city
of Richmond. However, a word of caution is in order. First, as argued earlier, the returns
to renewal projects may decrease rapidly with the size of the program. Second, to the
extent that the returns computed here include private investment in unobservable housing
characteristics, our ￿ndings may overstate the e⁄ects of the program. Finally, given our
￿ndings, a natural question arises: Could a developer have instead privately internalized (a
portion of) the external e⁄ects associated with the NiB program? In principle, this would
have been possible but to capture these externalities, the developer would have had to incur
the ￿xed cost of purchasing (parts of) the neighborhood. The return on total investment,
29therefore, would have been well within the norm of other standard investment vehicles.
For example, abstracting from structures, we estimate that the neighborhood of Jackson
Ward-Carver would have cost around $97 million. Our work then suggests that spending an
additional $4 million in capital improvements yielded about $28 million from externalities
over 6 years. Hence, the return from external e⁄ects alone would have come to roughly 4:1
percent at an annual rate. While this represents a reasonable rate of return, it is not one
that obviously dominates other investment opportunities given the initial investment of $97
million. Moreover, obtaining this return involves a degree of community participation that
would be di¢ cult for private developers to elicit.
Evidently, the results we obtain in this study are to a degree particular to the NiB program
and to the city of Richmond. That said, although the magnitude of housing externalities
may vary across settings, the evidence we uncover points to a general feature of residential
neighborhoods: The existence of signi￿cant housing externalities. In light of this evidence,
it would be misleading to omit this feature of residential neighborhoods in standard urban
theories used to design urban policy.
30References
[1] Anglin, P. and R. Gencay, 1996. ￿Semiparametric estimation of a hedonic price func-
tion.￿Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11(6), 633-648.
[2] Benabou, R., 1996. ￿Heterogeneity, strati￿cation, and growth.￿ American Economic
Review, 86(3), 584-609.
[3] Davis, M. and F. Ortalo-Magne, 2007. ￿Household Expenditures, Wages, Rents.￿mimeo
University of Wisconsin.
[4] Davis, O. and A. Whinston, 1961. ￿The economics of urban renewal.￿Journal of Law
and Contemporary Problems, 26(1), 105-117.
[5] DiNardo, J. and J. Tobias, 2001. ￿Nonparametric density and regression estimation.￿
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 11-28.
[6] Ding C., R. Simons and E. Baku, 2000. ￿The e⁄ect of residential investment on nearby
property values: Evidence from Cleveland, Ohio.￿ Journal of Real Estate Research,
19(1), 23-48.
[7] Duranton, G. and D. Puga, 2004. ￿Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration
economies.￿In: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban
Economics, 4(48), 2063-2117.
[8] Durlauf, S., 2004. ￿Neighborhood e⁄ects.￿In: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.),
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 4(50), 2173-2242.
[9] Ho, M., 1995. ￿Essays on the housing market,￿Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Uni-
versity of Toronto.
[10] Ioannides, Y., 2002. ￿Residential Neighborhoods e⁄ects.￿Regional Science and Urban
Economics, 32(2), 145-165.
[11] Robinson, P., 1988. ￿Root-N-Consistent semiparametric regression.￿ Econometrica,
56(4), 931-954.
[12] Rosenthal, S. and W. Strange, 2004. ￿Evidence on the nature and sources of agglomer-
ation economies.￿In: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and
Urban Economics, 4(49), 2119-2171.
31[13] Rothenberg, J., 1967. Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal. Brookings, Washington
DC.
[14] Santiago A., G. Galster and P. Tatian, 2001. ￿Assessing the property value impacts
of the dispersed housing subsidy program in Denver.￿Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management, 20(1), 65-88..
[15] Schall, L., 1976. ￿Urban renewal policy and economic e¢ ciency.￿American Economic
Review, 66(4), 612￿ 628.
[16] Schwartz A. E., I. G. Ellen, I. Voicu and M. Schill, 2006. ￿The external e⁄ects of place-
based subsidized housing.￿Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36(6), 679-707.
[17] Simons R., R. Quercia and I. Maric, 1998. ￿The value impact of new residential con-
struction and neighborhood disinvestment on residential sales prices.￿Journal of Real
Estate Research, 15(2), 147-162.
[18] Strange, W., 1992. ￿Overlapping Neighborhoods and Housing Externalities.￿Journal
of Urban Economics, 32(1), 17-39.
[19] Yatchew, A., 1997. ￿An elementary estimator of the partial linear model.￿Economics
Letters, 57(2), 135-143.
[20] Yatchew, A. and J. No, 2001. ￿Household gasoline demand in Canada.￿Econometrica,
69(6), 1697-1710.
32Figure 1: Overview of the Neighborhoods-in-Bloom Program, Richmond VA
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Figure 2: A model of housing externalities

























Figure 3: Funding locations and impact areas in Blackwell
35Figure 4: Pre-NiB land prices per square foot in Richmond
36Figure 5: Distribution of changes in land value in the neighborhoods targeted by NiB
37Figure 6: Change in the return to land with distance from the impact area
38Figure 7: NiB returns to land
39Figure 8: Returns to land in the control neighborhood
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Figure 10: Calibrated model and nonparametric estimates of land returns
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